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Abstract 
 
This paper constructs a baseline and pursues an overall impact evaluation of the 
PETT (Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras), an ambitious rural titling 
program created in Peru in 1992. The general evaluation of impacts on farmers 
shows a picture of not many positive effects, at least in the short period of the 
evaluation (2004-2006) and for a limited sample of farmers located in the Coast 
and Sierra regions. On average, most income variables (and income composition) 
do not seem to be impacted by titling, and there are no detectable effects on 
investments (except for permanent pasture in the Sierra) or other outcome 
variables, such as credit, land markets, or land conflicts. However, this general 
picture hides important impacts that may occur for some groups of farmers, or for 
farmers facing different constraints in the pre-intervention stage.  Given the 
limitations, we investigated in more detail two important channels that are behind 
the potential impacts of rural titling programs: credit access and use of land rental 
markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
Peru has been implementing an ambitious rural titling program during the past decade.  With 
financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), an agency of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, called PETT (Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras, created in 1992), 
began increasing its titling operations in the mid-1990s.  In its first stage (1996-2001), the titling 
effort was oriented mainly toward modern areas along the Coast that had been affected by 
Agrarian Reform in the 1970s; in 2002, the emphasis of the program switched toward titling the 
more traditional Andean (or Sierra) region.  The Peruvian rural land titling program is considered 
one of the largest in South America, given the massive number of plots and farmers it aims to 
reach.
1 
Notwithstanding its importance and maturity, the impact of the Peruvian rural land 
program has not been rigorously evaluated because it lacked a proper baseline.
2  For the second 
phase of the IDB-financed titling program (2002-2006), it was considered necessary to construct 
a baseline and pursue an overall impact evaluation for the program.  A baseline survey of a 
representative sample of rural households was conducted at the end of 2004 by the GRADE-
Cuanto consortium (Zegarra et al., 2005). In October 2006, a final impact survey was conducted 
for the same sample (Zegarra et al, 2006). This evaluation was based on difference-in-difference 
estimators for treated and matched comparison groups; it is the main source of data for this 
study.
3 
The results obtained in the impact evaluation were not very impressive (regarding the 
impact of titling) because few impact variables could be identified as moving in a positive way 
due to the PETT titling process between 2004 and 2006.  For instance, most variables associated 
with income (and its composition) did not show any significant effects (at least due to titling).  
                                                 
1  According to the Peruvian Agricultural Census (1994), there are 1.75 million farmers in Peru with about 5.5 
million plots.  The national cadastre of rural plots developed by PETT accounts for about 2.5 million plots currently 
(2006), although it does not cover all the agricultural area (for instance, communal lands are not included).  Of the 
area in the rural cadastre, our estimate is that PETT has titled about 40 percent of the plots or about 1 million parcels 
during the last decade. 
 
2 In an effort to solve this problem and come out with credible impact measures, Torero and Field (2005) used 
LSMS type household surveys (ENNIVs) from 1994, 1997, and 2000 combined with a new specific survey applied 
in 2004.  Combining these surveys, the authors were able to build a data set at the plot and farmer levels that was 
used for impact evaluation purposes.  This important effort, however, did not produce conclusive results for most 
impact variables of title on welfare, investments, and credit access, especially when applying difference-in-
difference estimators.   
 
3 There was an additional gathering of data at the community level for this study.  Data on credit supply, relative 
price of agricultural factors, and other non-PETT interventions were included in the community questionnaire.   5
And access to credit did not have a statistically significant impact.  For the Sierra, the only 
variable that titling seemed to affect was installation of permanent crops; but this was mainly in 
new pastures for cattle.  However, on the Coast there were marginally significant effects on 
agricultural income and the value of livestock.  In both regions, it was not possible to find any 
significant effects on other variables, such as various types of investments, conservation 
practices, land values, agricultural and non-agricultural assets, and land conflicts. 
A limitation of the standard matching methods for impact evaluation that were used in the 
above-mentioned evaluation is that the estimates, which provide only average effects, offer little 
information on the potential channels through which any impacts may have affected the 
decision-making of farmers.  An analyst might look at the average impact variables and be able 
to say something about the relative importance of some channels that may appear to be active.  
But it could be the case that some channels are only active for some types of farmers or for 
farmers in particular circumstances or contexts.  If this were the case, the analyst may want to cut 
the sample in a way that would maintain the basic assumptions of the matching method and lead 
to conclusions about the relevant channels for the observed impacts.  
Methodologically, in this study, we do not estimate full structural models of farmer 
behavior or even reduced forms in which an exogenous variable gives estimates of the impact of 
titling on behavior.
4 Instead, we keep our main approach inside the paradigm of the impact 
evaluation literature, using economic theory to identify appropriate variables to condition the 
estimation of impacts with matching techniques and to shed light on the potential channels.  We 
start by developing a simple diagram that highlights some of the key expected impacts of titling 










                                                 
4  A recent example of the approach of using structural equations to estimate the impacts on land markets and 
income of a titling program like Procede in the Mexican ejido land reform is given by Bresciani (2004).   6
 
Figure 1.1. Expected Impacts of Titling on Income 
 
 
We distinguish credit constrained and credit unconstrained households, and look at 
investment and income generating activities.  For unconstrained households, an impact of titling 
on investment, productivity, and income can be interpreted as a direct effect of more tenure 
security over land assets, which makes investment more profitable. For credit constrained 
households, the impact of titling becomes conditioned on increases in liquidity, which may come 
from credit markets or self-finance alternatives.  Households can increase their investment and 
income due to titling only if the liquidity constraint is relaxed.   
In this study, we are particularly interested in exploring the importance – for measuring 
the effects of titling – of credit constraint regimes, which are unobservable.  We develop an 
empirical strategy to identify credit constrained and unconstrained regimes, and thus have an 
important dimension to cut our sample when estimating impacts using matching methods.   At 
the same time, we are interested in evaluating the role of the land rental market channel, 
especially as a potential source of self-finance for credit constrained farmers.  We hypothesize 
that the land rental market becomes more active for titled farmers only under certain 
circumstances, such as when the density of titling in the community is high enough for 
transaction costs to go down.  This last issue is important for a titling program than operates for 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the main 
approach that we use for evaluating impacts using matching methods.  Section 3 describes the 
titling process that characterized PETT in rural Peru during the period under evaluation.  This 
description is important for identifying whether the process may have some features that are 
amenable to the matching approach, and for identifying some variables that need to be 
considered when estimating matching scores between treated and control groups.  We also 
explain the sampling process in more detail in Annex 1.   
Section 4 describes the conceptual approach and estimation of unobservable credit 
constraint regimes, which will be used to condition for potential impacts of titling on diverse 
outcome variables.  In Section 5, we develop a model of the land rental market with tenure 
insecurity and transaction costs associated with titling density.  In this case, we re-estimate the 
impacts using title density (at the community level) as a cutting variable of the sample.  Section 6 
presents the main conclusions of the study. 
 
2. The Impact Evaluation Approach
5 
The so-called evaluation problem is generally a problem of establishing causality.  A public 
program generates an impact or change on people’s lives and we want to know if they improved 
their welfare due to that intervention.  For establishing this potential causality between the 
intervention and people’s welfare, we need to know what would have happened to these people 
without the intervention (a counterfactual). We then compare what happened with what would 
have happened on the welfare variable.  Obviously, we cannot observe the same people in these 
two states.  Observing people before and after an intervention generally does not solve the 
problem, because other socio-economic factors—besides the intervention itself—may have 
affected the impact variable as well. 
The solution to this problem in the evaluation literature is to build a counterfactual group 
(that mimics the behavior of the treated group without the intervention) from those who were not 
intervened.  For this to be a reasonable approach, some conditions must hold.  The counterfactual 
group must be similar to the treated one in some fundamental way, i.e., the people must be 
equally likely to have participated in the program, but did not participate due to some exogenous 
factor (i.e., not related to their characteristics).  One way to ensure that this condition holds is 
                                                 
5 See Duflo et al. (2006), Heckman et al. (1997), and Manski (1995). 
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through randomization of the program among potential beneficiaries, so that both the treated and 
counterfactual groups come from the same distribution.  When randomization is not feasible or 
was not adopted, another approach is to build the counterfactual from the people who did not 
participate in the program during the period under evaluation, which is the method we use in this 
study.
6 
We formalize some of the ideas stated here.  We define an impact variable Y, which may 
take different values according to observed program participation (Y1 if D=1 and the agent 
participates, or Y0 and D=0 and the agent does not participate).  The value of Y at any point is: 
 
  Y = D(Z)*Y1 + (1-D(Z))*Y0   (2.1) 
 
We denote D(Z) the observed participation status, depending on a set of variables Z, 
which determine program participation. The main goal of impact evaluation is to estimate E(Y1-
Y0|D=1,Z), i.e., the expected value of the change in the impact variable conditional on 
participation (this is called the mean treatment effect on the treated).  This requires knowledge 
about E(Y0|D=1,Z), which is the value that Y would have taken for a non-participating agent if 
that agent had participated in the program (the counterfactual), which is not observable.  
Instead, impact evaluation looks for a suitable estimator of E(Y0|D=1,Z) based on 
observables, which may be, for instance, E(Y0|D=0,Z), i.e., the expected value of the impact 
variable for the non-participating group.  If the impact variable Y has the same conditional (on 
Z) distribution independent of participation status, we can build the counterfactual using 
observable information. This is a required assumption for using non-experimental data to 
estimate the impact of treatment on the treated.  This assumption is formalized as: 
  
E(Y0|D=1,Z) = E(Y0|D=0,Z)= E(Y0|Z)   (2.1A) 
 
                                                 
6 Programs like rural titling in Peru have some features that are close to the situation in which a reasonable 
counterfactual can be built.  The extent of land formalization in rural Peru prior to the intervention (circa 1994) was 
so low that the strategy implemented by PETT was one of massive coverage, working entire agricultural areas as 
titling blocks.  Even if there may have been some selection rule or prioritization at the level of these blocks, the 
process of individual titling was hardly based on demand; it was more a typical exogenous intervention coming from 
outside the communities.  At the same time, all areas were eligible (with the exception of communal and protected 
areas), and the probability of receiving a title for a farmer depended more on location and the timing of the general 
process.  We explore in more detail the process of titling and potential biases in Section 3. 
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According to equation 2.1A, Y0|Z is independent of D, the participation status, and both the 
participating and non-participating units will have the same conditional distribution of the impact 
variable regardless of participation status.   
 
Matching methods 
When exogenous randomization (or experimental design) on the participation status is made, 
condition (2.1A) is automatically accomplished as far as the eligible units are randomly extracted 
and assigned to participation status before the intervention occurs from a known and well defined 
population.  When randomization does not occur (a non-experimental framework such as the one 
we have for this study), condition (2.1A) must be assumed and is the basis for using matching 
methods. 
The main point of the matching methods is that the researcher is able to observe all 
relevant variables Z that explain participation in the program and so can observe (and 
consistently estimate): 
  0 < Pr(D=1|Z) < 1    (2.1B) 
 
This is the probability of participation in the program as a function of those conditioning (and 
observable) variables Z.  Under (2.1A) and the existence of probability such as (2.1B), the 
matching estimators of the impact (in a non-experimental framework) will identify the same 
parameters as the ones in an experimental design.   
We now focus on the impact variables and define a set of variables T and U that 
determine the impact variables according to: 
 
    Y = g(T) + U      (2.2) 
 
where g(.) is a deterministic function of observed T variables and U are unobserved variables to 
the researcher. The main concern with a non-experimental impact evaluation is the potential 
relationship between Z and U.  If there is dependence or correlation (or variables in common) 
between Z and U, the unobservables will affect both participation and impacts, and the matching 
method will not be able to eliminate the bias from selection on unobservables. The most 
favorable case for the matching method to estimate unbiased impacts is when Z and U are 
independent, so that any selection on Z will not bias the impact assessments.     10
Estimation of the impacts requires (2.1A) to be able to condition on variables Z.  This is 
very demanding in terms of data processing because differences in impact variables must be 
conditioned on multi-dimensional variables.  However, the evaluation literature has shown that 
conditioning only on Pr(Z) is equivalent, and the matching process can be done in the one-
dimensional P(Z), which is the probability of program participation.  The estimation of P(Z) 
plays a central role in impact evaluation because matching between treated and comparison units 
will be based on this function, which is called the p-score variable. 
In practice, P(Z) makes the treated and comparison groups comparable on Z, and each 
treated observation is assigned a comparison (or group of comparisons) to get a measure of the 
difference in the values of the impact variable.  The mean of these values over a well defined 
support on Z is the estimated impact or average effect of treatment on the treated.   
 
How matching handles potential biases in non-experimental data 
Two sources of bias arise with matching procedures.  The first is related to the common support 
on Z.  It is only for positive and overlapping values for the treated and comparison groups on 
P(Z) that the procedure will estimate parameters equivalent to those obtained in an experimental 
setting with the same support.  The second bias is related to the distribution of P(Z) in the 
common support. Comparing treated observations only with comparison observations weighted 
according to closeness in P(Z) provides a correct impact estimation, mimicking what would 
happen in an experimental setting. 
Another bias that potentially appears in an impact evaluation is related to non-observable 
variables U when these, for instance, are not independent of Z. If participation is somewhat 
based on unobservable variables U as well, which also affect expected impacts Y, the matching 
method will generate biased estimates of impacts, and we will not know the shape and direction 
of the biases without experimental data. 
However, if the unobservable variables that have these features are permanent, the bias 
may be eliminated using difference-in-difference estimates, which can be calculated when data 
on pre-program and post-program variables are available.  In our case, this option is available 
because we have pre-program or baseline data for this study, and the assumption required is that 
the Z variables are independent of the difference in the U’s at the two points in time. 
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Assessing impact channels 
The final idea that we will use in this study is related to the relationship between Y and the 
conditioning variables in the impact equations. We assume a more complete model for the 
impact equation: 
 
  Y = g(T|X) + U   (2.2') 
 
in which the impact of T on Y is conditioned on the values of the X variables, which are related 
to the context or to binding constraints on the agent.  In order to be able to condition impacts on 
X variables, they must be uncorrelated with U (and also with Z), or with differences in the U’s 
over time when we use difference-in-difference methods.   
 
3. The Titling Process and Sampling Design 
In principle, we can divide the plots of land in rural Peru at some point in time (for example, 
2004) according to their ownership documents in three categories: (a) plots titled and registered 
before the PETT project, (b) plots titled and registered by the PETT project, and (c) plots with 
other types of documents not registered in the formal system.  The effort of titling by PETT in 
2004-2006 formalized property in the last category of plots.   
We looked into the details of the PETT titling process in order to detect similarities and 
departures from an experimental situation for impact evaluation, such as titling for individual 
farmers as part of a random process (and so, by definition, totally exogenous to farmers). There 
are four main entities that intervene in the titling process, for example for a plot in Peru: 
 
•  Aerophotograph National Service (a public firm called SAN) 
•  PETT-Central Office 
•  PETT-Regional Offices 
•  SUNARP (National Registry) 
 
The program hires SAN to take aerial photos of specific locations.  According to our 
interviews, the locations are required by PETT regional offices according to their annual work 
plans.  SAN is a service that is provided by the Air Force of Peru. The service is limited by 
climatic conditions and flight plans related to the overall operation of the firm.   12
After receiving the aerial photos, PETT’s central office begins the process of converting 
the images into digital information, using diverse techniques, such as spatial triangulation models 
and photogrametric restitution.  The (unprocessed) photos are also sent to the requesting regional 
office, which at that point begins one of the most important parts of the titling process: gathering 
information in the field.  PETT’s regional staff uses a complete aerial photo (vuelo 
aerofotográfico) to plan the process of gathering information on all plots in the related area.   
PETT’s personnel choose one extreme of the image, identify the nearest community, and 
travel there to cover all the relevant area inside the photo, visiting each involved community to 
collect information on all their plots.  In this process, PETT’s personnel fill in a plot-specific 
document (ficha) for each plot, and obtain all the required documentation that can be used to 
show possession or property of the plot by the farmer making the claim.  In general, the entire 
process is made in blocks of plots, which are divisions of the area covered by the aerial photo. 
According to Peruvian legislation, individual farmers can use several alternative 
documents to show that they have been farming the land peacefully during the past years (which 
is enough to claim the property). For example, they may use previous titles or acquisition 
documents, payment of water tariffs, declarations from neighbors, payment of local taxes and 
other receipts, or any proof of being a farmer working peacefully on the plot.  According to 
PETT’s staff, the documents most often used by farmers are declarations by neighbors, followed 
by minutas de compra-venta, a document that is generated by a notary when land is acquired 
from a third party. 
When they go to the field to gather information on the plots, PETT’s personnel seek to 
obtain all the necessary documentation. However, sometimes key documents may be lacking, 
such as the personal identification of one or both of a married couple.  At this point, the marital 
status of the claiming farmer is also established. In the case of a married or stable couple (for at 
least two years), it is obligatory to assign any land property to both spouses unless one of them 
had already established an individualized claim to the property prior to the marriage.  A sketch is 
made of each individual plot.  All of the field information is then combined with the data 
processed by PETT’s central office (after processing) to form a legal file or expediente, which 
involves all the documentation related to the titling process of a plot and is sent to the National 
Registry, SUNARP.  All the legal files that are ready and that belong to the same block are sent 
together.   13
SUNARP then takes over and evaluates the documentation according to the registration 
procedures and legal requirements (including the publication of claimed owners in a local paper).  
After the registration process is completed, a title for each plot is generated and the process of 
giving the title to each farmer is part of the responsibility of PETT and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
 
The sampling process 
During the titling process, PETT also generates a cadastre of rural plots based on the information 
it has collected.  The cadastre is a complete list of plots, containing information such as the aerial 
photo to which each plot was assigned, the coordinates of the plot, the date when PETT visited it, 
its shape and area, the current status of the property (according to the most recent update), and 
whether the owner already had the title.  The cadastre also contains information on some of the 
attributes of the owner or owners – name, identification number, and some information taken 
from the original ficha.
7   
The cadastre is a key element for this study; we used it as the basis for taking the baseline 
sample of plots (and households) in 2004.  The decision to use the cadastre of plots as our 
sampling framework was based on the fact that a high proportion of non-titled plots in the 
cadastre qualified as good candidates for receiving a PETT title in the period 2004-2006 (the 
treatment period) but, due to delays and the long duration of the titling process, did not receive a 
title in that period. We thus assigned them to the control group of the evaluation.  Another 
important factor was that the PETT cadastre is the only available database of plots that has been 
built in a systematic way and allows systematic sampling. However, the database has important 
limitations, which are explained in Annex 1 (see footnote 7). 
A sample of districts, areas, and plots was taken from five built-up geographical domains 
in the rural Coast and Sierra regions, using an adjusted version of the cadastre of 2004 as the 
sampling framework (see Annex 1 for more details on the sampling design and stratification).  
The original baseline sample had 2,234 households but only 2,034 households were interviewed.  
The final evaluation survey in 2006 was able to find about 1,800 of the same baseline households 
and applied a similar questionnaire to them.  Data were collected on income, agricultural and 
non-agricultural production, land market activity, agricultural and soil conservation practices, 
                                                 
7 It turned out that some of the fields in the database (especially those related to the title status of plots in 2004) were 
not updated as the titling process progressed. This adversely affected the sampling design, which is discussed in 
Annex 1.   14
investments, access to credit (formal and informal), land conflicts, and other household and 
dwelling characteristics.  No expenditure data were collected.  A final visit to all of the involved 
communities was made for the purposes of this study, in which a community questionnaire was 
applied to local informants to gather information about the presence of credit institutions over 
time, land and other factor prices, and the presence of other non-PETT public and private 
interventions. 
 
Potential biases in the titling process 
From the titling process description, we see that titling does not come as an endogenous decision 
of the farmer; it is more related to decisions taken at a state institution.  The methodology 
implemented by PETT during the titling process is of the universal coverage type and consists in 
working with all farmers over a small area without exception before continuing in a neighboring 
area.  This method of exogenous titling avoids the typical problem of reverse causality between 
titling and some impact variables, such as investment. 
However, from the description of the titling process, we can also see that there are 
potential biases that might affect the comparison between treated and comparison groups.  In this 
section, we analyze some of these characteristics.  To do so, it is important to distinguish two 
types of potential biases: area or group-based versus individual-based characteristics. Individual 
characteristics include attributes that imply that a particular plot or household did not receive the 
title or that there was a larger delay in receiving it due to attributes that affect the potential 
impacts of titling.  Group or area-based characteristics include characteristics of the area to 
which the plot belongs. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of households in each group (control 
and treatment) according to the titling density of the block to which the household belongs. The 
titling density of the block had been estimated from the 2006 PETT cadastre.  
Table 3.1 shows that more than 70 percent of the control group belongs to a block in 
which there is at least one plot with a PETT title.  The table shows that belonging to the 
treatment or the control group depends on a mix of group and individual characteristics. Group 
characteristics determine how advanced the titling process is in a particular block; individual 
characteristics determine when a particular household receives its title,  once the titling process 
has already begun on the block to which the household belongs. These potential biases must be 
dealt with in our matching process. 
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Table 3.1 
0   0-15 15-25 25-50 50-75 75  or more Total
Num households 50 32 13 36 27 30 188
Percentage 26.6 17.0 6.9 19.1 14.4 16.0 100.0
Titled between Num households 5 14 13 45 63 89 229
2004 and 2006 Percentage 2.2 6.1 5.7 19.7 27.5 38.9 100.0
T o t a l 5 54 62 68 19 0 1 1 9 4 1 7
Sources
Titling density: 2006 PETT cadastre
Control and treatment: GRADE-CUANTO Final Households Survey
Percentage of plots titled in the block
No PETT
Distribution of households in the sample according to the percentage of plots titled in the block
 
 
From the description of the titling process, we think the individual characteristics that 
might introduce biases in the estimates of titling impacts include the following: 
•  Migration levels.  Families whose members present higher migration 
levels might have a lower likelihood of being titled because the owner of the plot might 
be absent when PETT personnel arrive in the town.  
•  Access to personal identification documents.   Because these documents 
are a requisite, access to them should be correlated with access to a PETT title.  
•  Presence of conflict.  The presence of conflict would be correlated with 
access to a title because PETT’s personnel do not process plots under conflict. 
•  Characteristics associated with rejection of the title.  We have been told 
that some farmers are not willing to cooperate with the titling process because they are 
afraid of being taxed as a consequence of being titled.  Therefore, risk aversion is a 
characteristic that might be positively associated with rejection. 
•  Human capital.  Higher levels of human capital or education might be 
associated with receiving the title faster because mistakes in the legal file delay the 
process and are less likely to occur when the farmer has a higher level of education.  A 
common mistake in the legal file is that the name in the file is not exactly the same as the 
name on the personal identification document. 
 
The group or area characteristics that might differ between the treatment and control 
groups include the following: 
•  Land productivity.  Regions with higher levels of productivity might 
receive preferential treatment by the PETT office in the titling process.  This preferential 
treatment might lead to higher productivity regions being titled earlier.   16
•  Land fragmentation.  The impact of land fragmentation on the likelihood 
of being titled earlier is ambiguous.  More-fragmented zones could receive a lower 
priority because they imply lower levels of profitability for agriculture.  At the same time, 
in more-fragmented zones, the titling office might be able to deliver more titles in less 
time.  
•  Isolation. More-isolated areas might receive lower priority because of 
greater logistic costs. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the marginal effects of a probit model, at the plot level, which tries to 
explain the likelihood of being titled between 2004 and 2006.  This probit estimation is the basis 
for the matching analysis in the next section. The estimation excludes plots that had property 
conflicts in 2004 as well as plots whose owner said they were not interested in acquiring a PETT 
title in a follow-up survey in 2005.  Besides these two characteristics, which led to a marginal 
reduction in the size of the sample, the estimation includes almost all of the group and individual 
characteristics just mentioned with the exception of migration levels.
8 
                                                 
8 Migration levels were not included because the baseline survey (2004) did not include information on temporal 
migration.  However, a survey in 2005 showed no relationship between being titled after 2005 and temporal or 
permanent migration levels on 2005.  
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Table 3.2 
Between 2004 and 2006 Before 2004
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Individual Characteristics
Area owned (hectares) -0.0061 0.0020 *** -0.0023 0.0013 *
Age of head (years) 0.0021 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0009
Years of education of head 0.0039 0.0047 -0.0041 0.0031
Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.1637 0.0415 *** -0.2787 0.0258 ***
Family size -0.0151 0.0088 0.0237 0.0054 ***
Time from plot to farmer house 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004
Plot has high slope -0.0006 0.0523 0.0474 0.0338
Plot is in middle altitude area 0.0262 0.0444 0.0983 0.0283 ***
Plot is in high altitude area 0.1982 0.0467 *** 0.0683 0.0326 **
Percentage of plot with irrigation 0.0012 0.0004 *** 0.0018 0.0003 ***
Index of erosion in plot 0.0032 0.0235 -0.0234 0.0167
Index of quality of plot -0.0657 0.0314 -0.0406 0.0191 **
Index of livestock  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Area of the plot -0.0010 0.0051 -0.0047 0.0038
Head has ID 0.1235 0.0540 0.0288 0.0366
Spose has ID -0.0181 0.0539 -0.0438 0.0332
Group Characteristics
Time from plot to province capital -0.1506 0.0379 *** 0.0981 0.0250 ***
Time from plot to district capital -0.0012 0.0002 *** 0.0004 0.0002 ***
Level of land concentration (district) -8.2029 1.4688 *** -8.5549 0.9660 ***
Value of production per hectare (district) -0.0050 0.0123 -0.0130 0.0070
Dummy for Sierra -0.1636 0.0571 *** 0.1517 0.0325 ***
Number of obs 991 2317
LR chi2(20) 175.51 308.89
Prob> chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1278 0.0962
Source:  GRADE-CUANTO Final Households Survey
Determinants of receiving a title at the plot level
(Marginal effects of a probit model)
 
 
Table 3.2 also shows the determinants of being titled before 2004, just as a reference.  
From both estimations, we can see that there has been a change in the characteristics associated 
with being titled.  Distance acquired more relevance after 2004, and mother tongue reversed its 
relationship with the likelihood of receiving a title.  In addition, access to irrigation decreased its 
correlation with access to a PETT title. 
Table 3.3 shows the determinants of being titled, at the household level. These 
estimations exclude the households that reported a property conflict in 2004 as well as 
households that were not interested in receiving a title. The estimations for receiving a title after 
2004 are the base for the matching analysis, at the household level, that will be used in the next 
section.  The estimations in Table 3.3 show the same features as those at the plot level. 
As explained in the previous section, we will use difference-in-difference estimators to 
identify the impacts of titling.  A typical concern with the use of this method is the presence of   18
non-observables that are correlated with receiving the treatment as well as with the growth rate 
of some outcome variables, such as land productivity.  A way to assess the presence of this 
problem is to compare the growth rate of the treated and the control group, before the date at 
which the treatment was delivered.  
Table 3.3 
Between 2004 and 2006 Before 2004
Coef Std Err Coef Stad Err
Individual Characteristics
Area owned (hectares) -0.0073 0.0037 * -0.0036 0.0017 **
Age of head (years) 0.0052 0.0029 * 0.0017 0.0014
Years of education of head 0.0229 0.0091 *** 0.0090 0.0049 *
Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.3014 0.0871 *** -0.0821 0.0408 **
Family size -0.0327 0.0167 * 0.0065 0.0081
% of plots with high slope -0.1403 0.1308 -0.0488 0.0643
% of plots in med alt area 0.0123 0.1105 0.0433 0.0520
% of plots in high alt area 0.2930 0.1237 ** 0.1850 0.0688 **
Av of percentage of plot with irrigation 0.0702 0.0330 ** 0.0292 0.0184
Average index of erosion in plots 0.1870 0.0618 *** 0.0720 0.0332 **
Average index of quality of plots 0.0574 0.0719 0.0254 0.0309
Index of livestock  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Head has ID 0.0491 0.1095 0.0168 0.0539
Spose has ID 0.2470 0.0915 ** 0.0473 0.0503
Group Characteristics
Time from cap distr to prov capital -0.2481 0.0781 *** -0.0077 0.0354
Minimum Time from plot to district capital -0.0009 0.0004 ** -0.0004 0.0003
Level of land concentration (district) -11.1209 3.2418 *** -6.5824 1.3816 ***
Value of production per hectare (district) -0.0144 0.0222 -0.0049 0.0094
Dummy for Sierra -0.3267 0.0995 *** 0.0842 0.0448 *
Number of obs 290 621
LR chi2(20) 105.5 63.87
Prob> chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.2625 0.0957
Source:  GRADE-CUANTO Final Households Survey
Determinants of Receiving a Title at the household level
(Marginal effects of a probit model)
 
 
Table 3.4 presents the marginal effects of probit models that explain the likelihood of 
receiving a title after 2004, at the household and plot levels. These estimations include the 
growth rate, between 1997 and 2004, of the value of production per hectare at the district level 
(using aggregate data from the Ministry of Agriculture).  The table shows that, controlling for 
observables, the growth rate of land productivity is not significantly correlated with receiving the 
treatment.   19
Table 3.4 
Individual Characteristics Coef Std Err Individual Characteristics Coef Std Err
Area owned (hectares) -0.0062 0.0020 *** Area owned (hectares) -0.0078 0.0037 **
Age of head (years) 0.0025 0.0015 Age of head (years) 0.0051 0.0030 *
Years of education of head 0.0031 0.0048 Years of education of head 0.0245 0.0096 **
Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.1712 0.0417 *** Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.3120 0.0875 ***
Family size -0.0152 0.0089 Family size -0.0376 0.0173 **
Time from plot to farmer house 0.0000 0.0006 % of plots with high slope -0.1585 0.1328
Plot has high slope -0.0001 0.0524 % of plots in med alt area 0.0173 0.1117
Plot is in middle altitude area 0.0335 0.0446 % of plots in high alt area 0.3063 0.1256
Plot is in high altitude area 0.2044 0.0467 *** Av of percentage of plot with irrigation 0.0621 0.0419
Percentage of plot with irrigation 0.0012 0.0005 ** Average index of erosion in plots 0.1985 0.0634 ***
Index of erosion in plot 0.0058 0.0235 Average index of quality of plots 0.0828 0.0784
Index of quality of plot -0.0608 0.0319 Index of livestock  0.0000 0.0000
Index of livestock  0.0000 0.0000 Head has ID 0.0547 0.1098
Area of the plot -0.0011 0.0051 Spose has ID 0.2177 0.0975 **
Head has ID 0.1151 0.0542 **
Spose has ID -0.0193 0.0540
Group Characteristics Group Characteristics
Time from plot to province capital -0.1569 0.0382 *** Time from cap distr to prov capital -0.2499 0.0803 ***
Time from plot to district capital -0.0012 0.0002 *** Minimum Time from plot to district capital -0.0009 0.0004 **
Level of land concentration (district) -7.3992 1.5001 *** Level of land concentration (district) -10.7698 3.3554 ***
Value of production per hectare (district) -0.0014 0.0125 Value of production per hectare (district) -0.0157 0.0232
Value of prod per ha (growth rate) 0.0041 0.0048 Value of prod per ha (growth rate) 0.0106 0.0104
Dummy for Sierra -0.2032 0.0568 *** Dummy for Sierra -0.3211 0.1033 ***
Number of obs 982 Number of obs 281
LR chi2(20) 174.75 LR chi2(20) 107.88
Prob> chi2 0 Prob> chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.1284 Pseudo R2 0.277
Source:  GRADE-CUANTO Final Households Survey
Determinants of being titled, between 2004 and 2006, at the household and at the plot level. 
Marginal effects of a probit model
Household level Plot level
 
 
4. The Impact of Titling under Credit Constraints 
It is expected that producers will behave differently regardless of whether they were credit 
constrained in the formal market before the titling program was implemented. Furthermore, 
depending on the type of credit constraint they were facing (associated with risk, transaction 
costs, or quantity or price rationing), their behavioral response to titling could be different. In this 
section, we will explore these issues, looking at the titling impacts under different credit 
constraint regimes, which were constructed using direct elicitation from respondents.  
For a group of producers who were not credit constrained ex-ante, it is very unlikely that 
titling would benefit them through the credit channel. Obviously, impacts through the tenure 
security channel may still come into play. However, credit-constrained producers may benefit 
from a titling program through the credit channel if the constraint is eased because of having a 
land title.  Further, titling may affect producers differently depending on the type of credit 
constraint they may be facing. For example, we may hypothesize that those that are quantity 
constrained (i.e., those that applied for a loan and were rejected or did not apply because the 
subjective probability of rejection was high) may be more likely to benefit from titling than those 
that are risk constrained (i.e., they did not apply for a loan for fear of losing the collateral).    20
In order to evaluate whether the impact of titling through the credit channel has been 
obscured by the fact that some producers are not credit constrained in the sample, we decided to 
further explore this channel. In particular, we re-estimate the difference-in-difference estimators, 
dividing the sample into those highly credit constrained and those with low credit constraints. To 
do so, we need to deal with the fact that credit constraint status is not directly observed. 
 
Constructing credit constraint regimes 
If we consider a simplified model in which the rural household maximizes its expected utility of 
the end-of-period consumption, subject to liquidity, labor, and budget constraints, it is possible to 
show that the utility-maximizing behavior of the household differs depending on the regime 
(constrained or unconstrained) to which it belongs. Several authors – Foltz (2004), Carter and 
Olinto (2003), and Guirkinger and Boucher (2005) – develop utility-maximization models that 
capture such behavior. 
The problem with this type of modeling exercise, however, is that we do not observe 
whether a rural household is credit constrained. The literature offers two different approaches to 
tackle this situation. The first approach is based on direct elicitation of the credit regime, by 
asking the household head why he or she did not apply for a formal loan, or why he or she would 
not apply for one.  The second approach is based on the estimation of the likelihood of being 
credit constrained.  
Several authors have estimated the probability of being credit constrained through direct 
elicitation (see Feder et al. (1990) or Petrick (2004)). Using our baseline survey, we can assign 
each household to a credit regime. Table 4.1 shows a classification based on the answers we 
received to the question: “Why did (would) you not apply for a formal loan?” In addition to this 
question, rural households were asked, in case they asked for credit and were rejected, why they 
believe their request was rejected. Finally, if they received the credit, they were asked whether 
they got as much as they needed. Using these questions, it is possible to define being credit 
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Table 4.1 
Constrained Regimes Based on Direct Elicitation 
(“Why did (would) you not apply for a formal loan?”) 
Question  Type of Constraint 
I do not need a loan  
The interest rate is too high  
My land does not give me enough to repay a loan 
Unconstrained:  Price rationed 
I don’t want to give my land as a guarantee 
I fear to loose my land  
 
My product is too risky  
Constrained: Risk rationed 
Applied for a loan and were rejected  
 
Did not apply because the subjective probability 
of rejection was high 
Constrained: Quantity 
Have no Information  
 
Paperwork needed is time consuming and costly 




It is important to take with caution the estimated probability of being credit constrained 
coming from direct elicitation. As Gilligan et al. (2004) state, respondents with little or no recent 
experience in the credit market may have large errors in judging hypothetical questions regarding 
access to credit markets. In addition, self-reporting of a constraint in the credit market may hide 
an unrecognized constraint in another market. 
In order to assess the validity of self-reported credit constrained status, this study 
estimated a probit model to identify factors associated with being credit constrained and 
compared this estimation with the direct elicitation result. Taking into consideration that credit 
constraints arise from restrictions to an unobserved excess demand, both demand and supply-side 
determinants should be included in such a model. The fitted value of this model may provide an 
indicator of how likely it is that a rural household would be credit constrained.  
An alternative way to determine whether a rural household is credit constrained is to 
model jointly the determinants of being constrained with the behavioral model that is valid in the 
constrained and unconstrained scenarios. Unknown sample separation estimation is used to 
attach probabilities to households in the sample as to whether they have behaved according to a 
credit constrained or non-credit constrained rule. After all individuals are assigned to a certain 
credit regime, the behavioral model is estimated. The estimations of the joint model can be done   22
in sequence using the EM algorithm (as in Aliou and Zeller (2001)). By maximizing the joint 
likelihood, we assigned each individual to a constrained or unconstrained credit regime in a way 
that maximizes the likelihood of the data, given the identification assumptions that are 
introduced in the model.  
As  Gilligan et al. (2004)  state, this type of model requires the estimation of a structural 
or reduced-form model in which behavior is clearly affected by the credit constraint status. The 
kind of behavior that is typically modeled is that of consumption smoothing and/or farm labor 
demand. In the case of consumption smoothing, credit constraints reduce capacity to smooth 
consumption in the face of income shocks. In the case of farm labor demand, a credit constraint 
reduces the capacity to hire wage labor. In any of these cases, an empirical test is constructed to 
see if the division of the sample between a constrained and unconstrained credit regime is 
consistent with theory. Taking into consideration that our survey did not collect information on 
consumption, we will need to assess the validity of self-assessed credit constraints by focusing 
solely on total labor demand. 
For identification purposes, we can introduce credit supply-side variables that enter the 
first equation (the probit or switching equation) that are excluded in the outcome equation. That 
is, the existence of a supply of credit affects the total labor demand equation only by affecting 
the regime in which the household is assigned. Differences in the outcome equations between 
constrained and unconstrained regimes will also provide insight about the overall validity of the 
model. For example, we should verify that households that are ex-post classified as non-credit 
constrained make decisions that are not affected by the number of family members in the labor 
force, as they are able to hire any excess demand for labor from the market (that is, separability 
holds). 
Formally, we can characterize the sample behavior of credit constrained and 

















   (4.1) 
 
Here, some outcome variable (in this case y is the total labor demand per hectare) behaves 
differently, depending on whether the household is in the credit constrained regime or in the 
unconstrained regime. If the household is credit constrained, the exogenous determinants x affect   23
differently the outcome variable (through β1) than if the same household does not face the credit 
constraint. In the latter case, the same determinants affect the outcome variable through β1. Of 
course, the determinants may be different in the two regimes, which can be tested by equating to 
zero some parameters in β1 or β2. ε1 , ε2, and η  are normal iid disturbances with zero means and 
variances (with ση = 1 for identification purposes). As we have mentioned, the regime in which 
each rural household is assigned is unobserved. However, we know that this unobserved 
component depends on an array of factors that we denote here as z. 
For the purpose of the estimation, x is a subset of z. x includes the following: whether the 
plot owned by the household is titled; some characteristics of the owned plots (size, location, 
level of erosion, slope of the terrain, quality of the soil, proportion of land irrigated, and altitude); 
characteristics of the producer (gender, age, education, and maternal language); remoteness (time 
needed to go from the plot to the district capital); and family labor availability (female and male 
adults). In addition to this variable, which may also affect the probability of being credit 
constrained, z includes some variables that may help to identify the supply side of the credit 
market. These variables include the existence of formal credit institutions in the locality and the 
availability of credit in the three years previous to the base-line year. It is believed that these 
supply shifters may affect the net income per hectare only through releasing the credit constraint 
and shifting the individual from a constrained regime to an unconstrained one. 
 
Main results  
Table 4.2 shows the main determinants of being credit constrained using the self-reported credit 
constrained status. As expected, having a title reduces the probability of being credit constrained. 
In addition, more education and having Spanish as one’s maternal language also reduce the 
likelihood of being credit constrained. Finally, having formal credit institutions nearby proves to 
be an adequate instrument, as their presence also reduces the likelihood of being credit 
constrained. 
To assess the validity of the self-assessed credit constraint regime, we obtained an 
alternative estimate of the likelihood of being credit constrained (using a switching regression 
technique also known as a mixture model). The EM algorithm used in the estimation was 
developed by Dempster et al. (1977). The program was constructed using Stata by Zimmerman 
(1998). We used self-reported credit constrained status as the starting point of the algorithm.    24
It is important to stress that the model is not a full model that could help us capture the 
causal effects of titling. Its purpose is just to provide a consistent estimate of the probability of 
being credit constrained and compare it with the self-reported results. Figure 4.1  shows the 
results of both the estimated probability of being credit constrained based on self-assessment and 
the estimated probabilities estimated from the switcher equation and the determinants of total 
labor demand per hectare for both constrained and unconstrained regimes.       
Both estimates are reasonably correlated (r
2= 0.7). Although the assumption of 
competitive local labor markets (under which the switching regime equation provides a good 
approximation of the credit constrained regime) is questionable, it seems that both estimates 
capture the same underlying restrictions. Given this result, we decided to continue the analysis 
using only the estimates based on the predicted constraint regimes based on direct elicitation.   25
 
Table 4.2. 
Probability of Being Rationed 
(based on self-report) 
  Probit dF/dx  
Title  -0.148 *  -0.053 * 
(0.094)   (0.034)  
Land Size  -0.003   -0.001  
(0.004)   (0.001)  
Fragmentation Index  0.223   0.080  
(0.230)   (0.082)  
Maternal Language is Spanish  -0.288 ***  -0.106 ***
(0.109)   (0.041)  
Years of Education  -0.030 *  -0.011 * 
(0.013)   (0.004)  
Gender (Head of household is men)  0.010   0.004  
(0.129)   (0.044)  
Age of head of household  0.000   0.000  
(0.004)   (0.001)  
Remoteness (time to district capital)  0.000   0.000  
(0.001)   (0.000)  
Percentage of irrigated land  0.001   0.000  
(0.001)   (0.000)  
Cattle Ownership  0.000   0.000  
(0.000)   0.000   
Distance from district capital to province capital  -0.027   -0.010  
(0.095)   (0.034)  
Erosion Index  -0.042   -0.015  
(0.076)   (0.027)  
Percentage of plots in intermediate altitude land  0.019   0.007  
(0.125)   (0.046)  
Percentage of plots in high altitude land  0.083   0.030  
(0.165)   (0.059)  
Percentage of plots with high slope  0.057   0.020  
(0.166)   (0.060)  
Quality Index  0.038   0.013  
(0.042)   (0.015)  
Formal Financial Institutions  -0.218 *  -0.075 * 
(0.137)   (0.045)
Number of Male Adults  -0.045 -0.016
(0.039)   (0.014)
Number of Female Adults  -0.039 -0.014
(0.038)   (0.014)
Number of Children  -0.063 -0.023
(0.083)   (0.030)
Title density in district  0.053 0.019




Adjusted R-squared                    0.0281
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   26
   
 
Figure 4.1 
Probability of being Credit Constrained  





























Next we proceeded to re-estimate the impacts of titling using matching techniques and 
dividing the sample according to credit constrained and unconstrained regimes.  To identify these 
groups, we divided the sample in three parts and considered those at the top tercile of the 
estimated probability as having a high probability of being credit constrained.  In the case of 
those having a low probability of being credit constrained, we used the bottom tercile. 
The matching estimation was done at the household level,
9 and we used a large set of 
variables in the probit model for program participation (propensity score calculation).  Farmers 
who said they were not interested in titling as well as those who said they had a conflict with 
neighbors were eliminated from the control group. These farmers are not likely to obtain a title 
through the titling process.    
Annex 2 presents the probit results and analysis of sample balancing for the households 
before and after the matching procedure.  Important variables in the probit model are head of 
family attributes (age, education, and mother tongue), and some family land attributes (average 
plot fragmentation, distance to markets, erosion, quality, etc.).  We also incorporated in the 
probit a variable identifying whether the household head and spouse had identification at the 
time of the survey.  The rationale was that a household head without identification may have 
                                                 
9  See Annex 1 for the final sample size of households and plots that were used in the matching estimations 
presented in this and the next section.   27
more problems in obtaining a title at the end of the process.  The only variable we used to 
attempt to capture the potential preferences of regional PETT offices for areas with more farmers 
was land fragmentation.   
The estimation of impacts by type of credit regime are presented in Table 4.3, which 
reports average treatment on the treated effects estimates for two sub-samples: those that have a 
high probability of being credit constrained (upper tercile) and those that have a low probability 
of being credit constrained (lower tercile).  
Our results show that access to credit is not significantly different between the treated and 
control groups for those having, at the baseline, a similar probability of being credit constrained. 
This may be an indication that it is unlikely that the results obtained in assessing the impacts of 
titling in rural Peru come from the credit channel. These results continue to be consistent with 
previous results in the general evaluation of this program (Zegarra et at., 2006). Considering this 
result, we may conclude that there is evidence that the investment response to titling documented 
here more likely comes from the tenure security channel rather than the credit channel. 
An interesting point in Table 4.3 is the differentiated effects of land titling on the net 
supply of labor and income per hectare for those who were highly credit constrained at the 




Impact of Titling According to Credit Rationing Regime 
(based on endogenous switching model) 
  High  probability of being 
Credit Unconstrained 
Low probability of being 
Credit Constrained 
  ATT Std Dev ATT  Std Dev
Access to formal credit  -0.167 0.214 -0.510  0.401  
Non Agricultural Income   181.539 915.237 -304.724  2660.519  
Non Agricultural Income (share)  0.020 0.309 -0.141  0.221  
Net supply of labor  -0.195 0.423 -0.607  0.299 ** 
Remittances  -317.968 334.018 -42.901  44.637  
Total Income  664.024 2053.050 5090.356  9047.413  
Income per Hectare  -1106.524 1956.083 -2589.125  1157.052 ** 
Supply of Land (tenancy or rent)  0.320 0.271 0.215  0.223  
Supply of Land (tenancy, rent or 
loaned)  0.320 0.271 0.215  0.223  
Investment in Installations  0.000 0.000 0.117  0.401  
Investment in Conservation Practices  0.000 0.000 -0.002  0.223  
Investment in Permanent Crops   0.000 0.000 -0.510  0.401  
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To pursue our second line of interest, regarding the type of credit constraint farmers are 
facing, we estimated the likelihood of being credit constrained under different conditions. Using 
direct elicitation, we divided the sample into the following credit constraint regimes, which are 
presented in Table 4.1: 
1.  Quantity constrained. Applied for a loan and was rejected or did not apply 
because the subjective probability of rejection was too high. 
2.  Price constrained. Did not apply for a loan because the interest rate was 
too high. 
3.  Risk constrained.  Did not apply for a loan for fear of losing the collateral. 
4.  Transaction cost constrained. Did not apply for a loan because the 
transaction costs were too high. 
5.  Not credit constrained. Was non-quantity constrained. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the characteristics (a profile using a multinomial logit estimation) of 
those who were constrained in each of the above regimes. The baseline category is those who are 
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Table 4.4 
Determinants of  Credit Rationing by type (self assessment) 
  
Risk      
Rationed   
Transaction Cost 
Rationed    
Quantity     
Rationed   
Price 
Rationed 
Title  -0.742      -1.409 ***     -0.486       -0.323   
   (0.483)      (0.502)       (0.412)       (0.413)   
Land Size  -0.020      0.000       -0.019       0.021   
   (0.037)      (0.037)       (0.034)       (0.031)   
Land concentration/fragmentation  -2.209 *    -1.028       -1.329       -1.698 * 
   (1.159)      (1.184)       (0.974)       (0.976)   
Maternal Language is Spanish  0.158      -0.246       0.428       1.428 ***
   (0.582)      (0.598)       (0.513)       (0.530)   
Years of Education  -0.202 ***   -0.224 ***     -0.183  ***    -0.078 * 
   (0.061)      (0.070)       (0.047)       (0.046)   
Gender (Head of household is men)  0.025      0.302       0.003       0.093   
   (0.583)      (0.624)       (0.512)       (0.521)   
Age of head of household  -0.001      0.023       0.012       0.020   
   (0.018)      (0.019)       (0.015)       (0.015)   
Remoteness (time to district capital)  0.007      0.005       0.007       0.005   
   (0.005)      (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.005)   
Percentage of irrigated land  -0.010      -0.016 **     -0.009       -0.010 * 
   (0.007)      (0.007)       (0.006)       (0.006)   
Cattle Ownership  0.000      0.000       0.000       0.000   
   (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)   
Distance to the province Capital  0.403      0.393       -0.012       -0.024   
   (0.485)      (0.516)       (0.428)       (0.426)   
Erosion Index  -0.446      -0.343       -0.279       0.022   
   (0.375)      (0.395)       (0.313)       (0.305)   
Percentage of plots in intermediate altitude land  0.015      -0.204       -0.169       -0.084   
   (0.674)      (0.725)       (0.576)       (0.577)   
Percentage of plots in high altitude land  1.393      1.292       -0.172       0.323   
   (0.951)      (0.981)       (0.901)       (0.896)   
Percentage of plots with high slope  0.687      0.824       1.014       1.025   
   (1.085)      (1.104)       (1.011)       (1.001)   
Quality Index  -1.244 ***   -0.770 *     -1.049  ***    -0.635 * 
   (0.433)      (0.457)       (0.360)       (0.358)   
Formal Financial Institutions  -0.553      -0.426       -0.078       0.012   
   (0.636)      (0.643)       (0.474)       (0.470)   
Number of Male Adults  -0.090      -0.372 *     -0.121       -0.008   
   (0.174)      (0.196)       (0.146)       (0.142)   
Number of Female Adults  -0.020      0.398 **     -0.189       -0.012   
   (0.182)      (0.183)       (0.156)       (0.154)   
Number of Children  -0.385      -0.064       -0.289       -0.241   
   (0.418)      (0.419)       (0.357)       (0.355)   
Title density in district  -0.198      -1.576 *     0.102       0.857   
   (0.857)      (0.922)       (0.731)       (0.739)   
Constant  7.590 ***   5.075 **     7.418  ***    2.950   
   (2.287)      (2.406)       (1.928)       (1.917)   
Base Category: Non quantity rationed                                
Number of obs  536    Pseudo R2           0.1272      
LR chi2(84)  193.93    Log likelihood        -665.6      
Prob > chi2  0                            
Standard errors in parentheses                                
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01                                
 
   30
 
Using the predicted probabilities obtained from the multinomial logit estimation, we 
divided the sample into each of these regimes. Table 4.5 shows the differentiated effects of land 
titling for the two most frequent credit constrained regimes: quantity and price constrained.  The 
other two credit constrained regimes (those generated by risk constraints and transaction costs) 
made up a small fraction of the sample (less than 5 percent of the sample in both cases). Because 




Impact of Titling According to Credit Rationing Regime 
(based on endogenous switching model) 
  Quantity Constrained Price Constrained 
  ATT Std Dev ATT  Std Dev
Access to formal credit  -0.07 0.12   0.18  0.36  
Non Agricultural Income   8502.64 2748.97 ***  21003.16  20878.38  
Non Agricultural Income (share)  0.06 0.19   0.06  0.15  
Net supply of labor  0.03 0.23   0.12  0.39  
Remittances  82.06 200.86   0.00  0.00  
Total Income  8832.61 4734.58 *  -5394.66  4370.30  
Income per Hectare  1180.02 775.87 *  -1923.09  1985.46  
Supply of Land (tenancy or rent)  0.01 0.12   0.00  0.00  
Supply of Land (tenancy, rent or 
loaned)  0.03 0.13   0.20  0.20  
Investment in Installations  -0.04 0.14   -0.18  0.35  
Investment in Conservation Practices   -0.31 0.13 ***  0.08  0.18  
Investment in Permanent Crops   0.38 0.15 ***  -0.38  0.27  
 
 
The main result here is that when we separate those who have a high likelihood of being 
quantity constrained in the credit market (i.e., high probability of applying for a loan and being 
rejected or high probability of not applying because the subjective probability of rejection was 
too high), this group shows positive impacts of land titling that were not present earlier. In fact, 
this group shows a significant impact of titling on income (including income per hectare and 
non-agricultural income) as well as a significant impact on investments in permanent crops. Not 
surprisingly, this same group shows that this investment is associated with a reduction in 
investments in conservation practices as if the titling generated incentives for crop 
intensification.   31
producers
Base-Line
Interest rate is too high 14.71%
Land does not give enough to repay loan 15.89%
Don’t want to give land as a guarantee 0.48%
I fear to loose my land 17.71%
Paperwork is time consuming and costly  4.25%
My product is too risky  1.45%
Have no Information 12.24%
Other 5.72%
Base-Line
Did not hold a title 0.16%
Not enough guarantees 0.00%
Isuficient documentation 0.11%
Insufficient land holding 0.00%






Needs this type Prefers working with
other type of credit
Access to the Formal Credit Market: Self-Reported Credit Market Constraints
=  676,017
With Title No Title
82.63% 80.76%
No Title No Title With Title
16,420































With Title No Title
Obtained?
Obtained Credit




With Title No Title
Obtained as much as needed?
3.49% 8.02%5. Titling and the Land Rental Market 
In this section, we develop a model to explore the relationship between titling and land 
rental markets.  PETT’s titling strategy has an interesting feature in that complete areas are 
titled at the same time.  This opens the possibility that some impacts of titling on land 
markets (and other outcome variables) are generated due to a sort of externality effect of 
massive titling.  In land markets, for instance, it is more likely that massive titling reduces 
transaction costs than individualized titling, as many farmers after titling may have 
increased incentives to enter the land market as demanders or suppliers. 
We develop a simple model of a rental market in which there are two effects of 
titling.  In the first, titling increases tenure security at the individual level, and this 
generates more incentives to offer land in the rental market.  In the second, massive titling 
operates at the community level, and may decrease transaction costs both for suppliers and 
demanders of rental land. 
A model of land rental with transaction costs 
This model allows us to analyze the channels through which titling affects the supply of 
land in the rental market.  The model includes some of the elements presented in Carter 
and Chamorro (2000). We assume that there is only one period, in which the household 
works in agriculture and makes a decision about the amount of land used in agricultural 
production.  At the end of the period, the household sells the land at the market price.  To 
incorporate the idea of tenure security, we use (as in Carter and Chamorro (2000)) a 
positive probability of eviction for the land that is rented out.  
Algebraically, the household maximizes the following income function: 
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where  i A  is a parameter that represents technology, F () is the agricultural production 
function, T  is the household’s  endowment of land,  
i R  is the amount of land rented in, 
o R  is the amount of land rented out, r  is the land rental rate, c(d) are the transaction costs 
in the land rental market (which depend on the titling density, d), v is the sale price of  one 
unit of land, and p(t) is the probability of the land rented out not being evicted and   
depends on whether the farmer has a property title on the land.    33
The first term in the income function represents the value of production, the second 
term is the income derived from renting out land, the third term is the cost associated with 
renting land in, and the fourth term is the expected value of land at the end of the period, 
given the probability p(t) of not being evicted.  This probability increases when the 
household has a title on the land it owns. 
In this model, we assume that titling density (d) affects the transaction costs of the 
land rental market.  The idea is that, as we will see below, access to a title increases the 
supply of land in the rental market.  If there is a massive delivery of titles (for example, as 
a consequence of government intervention), there will be an important change in the 
number of land market transactions.  This change will eliminate the high transaction costs 
that prevail in the presence of thin markets. 
The FONC that solve the maximization problem are: 
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From these FONC, we can deduce that it will be profitable for the household to 
leave the autarchy regime and rent land out if the following condition holds: 
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      (5.4) 
This condition means that, in autarchy, the marginal income (equal to the rental price 
minus the transaction costs) of renting one unit of land out is higher than the marginal cost 
of renting one unit of land out.  The marginal cost is given by the loss in agricultural 
production plus the expected marginal loss in the value of land at the end of the period.  
This loss is equal to the probability of eviction of the land that is rented out, multiplied by 
the price of land.  







,  the right-hand side of equation (5.4) decreases 
when the household has a title.  Access to a title decreases the probability of eviction, 
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left-hand side of equation (5.4) increases when titling density increases.  Because an 
increase in titling density lowers transaction costs, this change will increase the marginal 
income associated with renting one unit of land out.  
Equation (5.4) defines a threshold that determines whether a household will belong 
to the regime characterized by a positive amount of land rented out. This threshold 
depends on the parameters of the model.  The figure shows the relationship between p(t) 
and d in determining the regime to which the household belongs.    
For a given land endowment, the households whose vector (p(t), d) is  below the 
line will not rent land out, while households whose vector (p(t), d) is above the line will 
rent land out.  Because the probability of not being evicted cannot be greater than one, 
there are values of titling density that create a prohibitive supply of land in the rental 
market.    
In general, for very low values of titling density, access to a title may not be 
enough in order for the household to change its regime.  In that sense, it is possible to state 
that a household characterized by a higher titling density would be more likely to actually 
respond to this increase in p(t)  with a change in regime, which means that the household 
would actually pass from autarchy to  renting land out. In the next section, we will see how 
the impact of having a title changes according to the density of the area where the 
household is located.  
 
In order to see this, we re-estimated the impacts of titling (using matching 
techniques at the plot level) for a sub-population of farmers located in an area with high 
titling density, defined as more than 60 percent of the sector with titled land by 2006.  We 
estimated the impacts for the overall sample and for the relevant sub-population. The 










Matching estimations of impacts of titling on renting-out land 
            
Variable Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T-stat  
Unconditioned impacts           
Land rented out or sharecropped  0.016  0.013  0.002  0.018  0.14   
Land rented out,  sharecropped or lent  0.018  -0.029  0.011  0.020  -0.55  
Number of observations with common support          939   
            
            
For plots in sectors with high density           
Land rented out or sharecropped  0.047  -0.021  0.068  0.037  1.83  *
Land rented out,  sharecropped or lent  0.047  -0.010  0.057  0.044  1.3   
Number of observations with common support              324   
 
 
We estimated impacts for all land that was rented out, sharecropped, or lent, and 
only for rentals and sharecropping.  In the unconditioned case, we do not find any 
significant impact of titling in the land rental market.
10  However, we do find a significant 
impact (at 90 percent significance) for the supply of rentals in areas with a high density of 
titling.  This suggests that high titling density is indeed an important condition for land 
market activation.  As also shown in the previous section, the titling process in rural Peru 
does not seem to have activated the financial channel for farmers.  In this context, using 
the land rental market as a way of financing non-agricultural activities may become more 
attractive.  The effect, however, will also be detected in areas with high enough titling 
density, which are the areas in which transaction costs are more likely to decline with 
massive titling. 
6. Conclusions 
The general evaluation of impacts on farmers generated by massive land titling in Peru 
shows a picture of not many positive effects, at least in the short period of the evaluation 
(2004-2006) and for a limited sample of farmers located in the Coast and Sierra regions. 
On average, most income variables (and income composition) do not seem to be impacted 
by titling, and there are no detectable effects on investments (except for permanent pasture 
in the Sierra) or other outcome variables, such as credit, land markets, or land conflicts. 
However, this general picture hides important impacts that may occur for some 
groups of farmers, or for farmers facing different constraints in the pre-intervention stage.  
Moreover, the estimation of average effects does not reveal how a potential impact would 
                                                 
10 Tables with information on the analysis of the matching results and the quality of matching used here (for 
plots) are presented in Annex 2.   36
occur in terms of the decision-making process of farmers.  Because of these limitations, we 
investigated in more detail two important channels that are behind the potential impacts of 
rural titling programs: credit access and use of land rental markets. 
In the case of credit access, we validated the use of self-reported credit access using 
an endogenous switching regression model and found that elicitation is acceptable for 
identifying credit access regimes among farmers.  Further, only when we distinguished 
farmers who are quantity constrained (versus risk constrained or transaction cost 
constrained) did we find that land titling indeed has significant impacts on outcome 
variables like agricultural income and investment.  A negative effect was observed in the 
use of conservation practices due to more intensive land use.  
For the land rental market, we found that density of titling is indeed an important 
condition for this market to be activated by the titling program.  Our theoretical model 
suggests that there is a threshold for titling density and other exogenous parameters such 
that farmers are more likely to offer land in the rental market when they are above that 
threshold.  A farmer who is titled but in an area of low density of titling has fewer 
incentives to supply land than one who is located in an area of high density titling.  This 
result suggests that the strategy of massive titling may be appropriate for generating 
significant reductions in transaction costs.  This effect in the supply of land rentals can be 
even more important if farmers are credit constrained and will use this market as a way to 
self-finance their agricultural and non-agricultural activities. 
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Annex 1. Use of the Cadastre and the Sampling Procedure 
A.1. The cadastre of rural plots: Advantages and limitations 
The cadastre is the most complete database that can be used for evaluation purposes of the 
rural titling project.  However, the cadastre has important limitations that are worth 
mentioning.  First, the cadastre is only built in areas that are considered potential sites for 
individual titling.  Extensive areas in the highlands (Sierra) that are under communal 
domain are excluded from the cadastre, even if plots are operated individually by farmers 
(comuneros).  Protected areas are also excluded from any cadastral (and titling) activity in 
coordination with the national authority (INRENA).  These are not important limitations 
for our study because those areas are not considered subject to private titling by PETT 
under current legislation, so it would not be appropriate to take samples there to evaluate 
the impacts of the PETT titling program. 
Second, the formation of the PETT cadastre did not follow the same methodology 
over time.  The method for entering and processing data during the first stage of the titling 
program (1996-2001) was changed in 2002 and afterward.  Therefore, the information in 
the cadastre for the Coast (which was the main focus in the first stage) contains more 
problems (for instance, regarding current title status) than the more recent cadastral 
information for the Sierra (which was the main focus in the second phase with the new 
method).   
Adding to the information quality problem, some variables in the cadastre seem 
particularly out of date, like the variable for the current property status of a plot.  It seems 
that the quality of information that is entered in the cadastre is decreasing along the titling 
process, which was described in Section 3.  For example, we cannot tell whether a plot did 
not have title in the database because of a problem in the registry (and so the claiming 
farmer would not receive a title) or because the title was still in some part of the process. 
Knowing this would have been very useful for constructing a more consistent control 
group taken only from those whose title was really in progress in the registry. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the cadastre is the most reliable source of 
information on plots (and households), and can be used for evaluating the potential 
impacts of the PETT program in rural Peru.  In the following, we describe the sampling 
procedure that was adopted for this purpose.   40
A.2. The sampling procedure 
We received the PETT cadastre database that was updated to June 2004.  There were 
2,207,199 plots in the national database.   The data did not include names or identification 
numbers of owners of the plots; they did include plot area, date of PETT visit, and current 
situation in the titling process (the SUNARP registered title).  Plots were geo-referenced 
and coordinates were provided. A distinctive unit in the database was a name for each 
sector, which was mostly associated with the community in which the plot was located. 
Some initial filters were applied to the database: 
 
•  Plots with a PETT visit before 1999 were dropped. 
•  Plots located in the jungle were dropped. 
•  Sectors with less than 21 plots were dropped. 
 
For the remaining database (1,639,421 plots), we identified whether the plot was 
titled using the variable on titling status.   A total of  9,350 sectors remained and a new cut 
was established to eliminate districts with less than eight sectors.  This was to eliminate 
districts with very low cadastral coverage.  A new total of 1,379,419 plots remained, which 
was the sampling framework used for this study.   In Table A.1, we present the distribution 
of the sampling framework by geographical domain and titling status (in the cadastre). 
Table A.1: Sampling Framework based on 2004 PETT Cadastre 
Titulación PETT según Catastro
No titulado Titulado Total % Pett
DOM1-CN 167,910 35,895 203,805 17.6%
DOM2-CCS 77,772 10,623 88,395 12.0%
DOM3-SN 461,379 83,059 544,438 15.3%
DOM4-SC 133,396 196,332 329,728 59.5%
DOM5-SS 119,400 93,653 213,053 44.0%
Total 959,857 419,562 1,379,419 30.4%
Fuente: Catastro Rural del PETT, marco muestral de ELB  
       Source: PETT Cadastre, 2004  
 
About 30 percent of the plots appeared with a registered title in the 2004 cadastre.  
The first two domains (Dom1 and Dom2) corresponded to the Coast, and the titling ratio 
that appeared in the cadastre was very low (17 and 12 percent), considering that the titling 
process was already deep in that region by 2004.  This situation was related to the lack of 
update of the titling variable in the cadastre, as was already mentioned.  In the case of the   41
highlands (Doms 3 to 5), the titling situation seemed to be more in line with the real 
situation of that region as the cadastral information was better recorded. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the titling variable in the cadastre, we 
constructed an indicator of titling density (by PETT) in order to select a sample that would 
incorporate variation in this key variable.  We classified districts as primary sampling units 
with high-density if more than 50 percent of its sectors were also high-density (more than 
70 percent of plots titled).  Low-density districts were considered as those with more than 
50 percent of sectors of low-density (less than 30 percent plots titled).  The remaining 
districts were medium-density.  The framework has 330 districts, distributed in three 
density categories and five geographical domains, which made up the initial structure of 
the sample (15 strata), as shown in Table A.2. 
 
Table A.2.: Structure of sampling framework by 
titling density and domains 
 
Estructura del marco muestral
dominio Tit_Baja Tit_Media Tit_Alta Total
DOM1-CN 56 16 3 75
DOM2-CCS 50 3 1 54
D O M 3 - S N 5 89 57 2
D O M 4 - S C 1 01 82 85 6
DOM5-SS 35 31 7 73
Total 209 77 44 330
Estructura de muestra propuesta
dominio Tit_Baja Tit_Media Tit_Alta Total
D O M 1 - C N 1 04 11 5
DOM2-CCS 8 2 1 11
D O M 3 - S N 1 04 21 6
DOM4-SC 4 4 6 14
DOM5-SS 6 6 2 14
T o t a l 3 82 01 27 0  
Source: PETT Cadastre, 2004  
 
Table A.2 also shows the structure of the proposed sample of districts to be taken 
in the first stage of the sampling, which has a total of 70 districts, in proportion to the 
original structure.   Random sampling was applied in the first stage of the sampling in each 
strata. 
After selecting 70 primary units, we proceeded to make a second round of 
sampling in which the sampling units are sectors, or second units of sampling.  Sectors 
were stratified again according to their titling density.  A sample of 282 sectors was taken 
from all strata in this stage, and total information (including names of owners) was 
requested from PETT in order to proceed to the final sampling stage, in which the sample   42
units are plots (and their owners).  In this case, we stratified plots according to their size in 
order to generate variation in this variable as well.  The categories for size were: (i) less 
than 1 ha; (ii) 1-2 has; (iii) 2-5 has; and (iv) more than 5 has.  Table A.3 shows the final 
structure of the sample of plots by domain and titling density. 
 
 
Table A.3.: Sample of Plots by domain and density 
TS-Baja TS-Media TS-Alta Total
DOM1-CN 202 216 72 490
D O M 2 - C C S 2 8 04 0 3 23 5 2
DOM3-SN 353 90 72 515
DOM4-SC 144 120 192 456
DOM5-SS 209 152 80 441
Total 1188 618 448 2254  
Source: PETT Cadastre, 2004  
 
The original sample was selected with a large number of potential substitutes for 
plots or owners who could not be interviewed.  The substituted plots were selected from 
the same final strata in which the original sampled plot was selected, so it kept the same 
selection probability.   
 
Final size of the household sample 
In the baseline, 2,034 households were surveyed. After a matching process, some 
households were excluded because of non-comparability, and only 1,855 households were 
supposed to be visited on 2006.  Of these households, 141 were not actually interviewed 
due to absences or rejections.   Of the 1,714 observations, it was possible to derive the 
titling category of only 1,325 households.   It was not possible to derive the category of 
some households because of missing data on the time they received the title or 
inconsistencies between surveys. The titling category of these households was distributed 





Table A.4.   43
Number of households and parcels per titling category
Households Parcels
No title 205 788
PETT Title before 2004 728 1,883
PETT Title after 2004 238 832




Only the households in the “No title” or “PETT Title after 2004” categories were 
used for the analysis.   These two categories sum to 443 observations.   Analysis of the 50 
percent of the households with the lowest likelihood of being constrained (according to the 
switching endogenous model) used 107 observations instead of 221, because 11 
observations had a conflict in 2004, 5 observations were owners that did not want to title 
their parcels, and 98 observations were missing outcome or control variables.  Analysis of 
the 20 percent of the households with the highest likelihood of being constrained 
(according to the switching endogenous model) used 75 observations instead of 88 because 
of missing control or impact variables. 
 
Final size of the parcels sample 
The 1,714 households that were surveyed on 2004 and 2006 had 5,450 parcels.  Of these 
parcels, it was possible to find a titling category only for 3,811 parcels.  It was not possible 
to find the titling category for all the parcels because of missing information on the date 
the title was delivered or because of inconsistencies between surveys.   The titling category 
of the parcels was distributed according to the frequency in Table A.5..  
Analogous to the analysis for households, we only used the parcels that belonged to 
the “No title” or “PETT Title after 2004” categories.  These sum to 1,620 parcels. Of 
these, only 996 parcels were used in the global analysis. Sixty observations were not used 
because these parcels had a conflict in 2004, 18 parcels were not used because the owner 
did not want to title these parcels, and the remaining 546 observations were not used 
because of missing values.  
 
Justification for the final size of the household sample used for this study 
In the baseline, 2,034 households were surveyed. After a matching process, some 
households were excluded because of non-comparability, and only 1,855 households were 
supposed to be visited in 2006. Of these households, 141 were not actually interviewed 
due to absences or rejections.   Of the remaining 1,714 observations, it was possible to 
derive the titling category of only 1,325 households.   It was not possible to derive the   44
category of some households because of missing data on the time they received the title or 
inconsistencies between surveys. The titling category of these households was distributed 
according to the frequencies shown in Table A.5.. 
 
   Table  A.5 
Number of households and parcels per titling category
Households Parcels
No title 205 788
PETT Title before 2004 728 1,883
PETT Title after 2004 238 832




Only the households that belonged to the “No title” or “PETT Title after 2004” 
categories were used for the analysis.  These two categories sum to 443 observations.   
Analysis of the 50 percent of households with the lowest likelihood of being constrained 
(according to the switching endogenous model) used 107 observations instead of 221 
observations, because 11 observations had a conflict in 2004, 5 observations were owners 
that did not want to title their parcels, and 98 observations were missing outcome or 
control variables.  Analysis of the 20 percent of the households with the highest likelihood 
of being constrained (according to the switching endogenous model) used  75 observations 
instead of 88 because of missing control or impact variables. 
 
Justification for the final size of the parcels sample used for this study 
The 1,714 households that were surveyed in 2004 and 2006 had 5,450 parcels.  Of these 
parcels, it was possible to find a titling category only for 3,811 parcels.  It was not possible 
to find the titling category for all the parcels because of missing information on the date 
the title was delivered or inconsistencies between surveys.   The titling category of the 
parcels was distributed according to the frequency in Table A.5..  
Analogously to the analysis for households, we only used the parcels that belonged 
to the “No title” or “PETT Title after 2004” categories.  These sum to 1,620 parcels. Of 
these, only 996 parcels were used in the global analysis. Sixty observations were not used 
because these parcels had conflict on 2004, 18 parcels were not used because the owner 
did not want to title these parcels, and 546 observations were not used because of missing 
values.    45
Annex 2. Matching Quality Analysis 
Table A.2.1. 
Balancing of samples by matching: Credit Constrained Households 
 
Variable
Area owned (hectares) Unmatched 6.30 9.95 -30.3 -4.69 ***
Matched 6.48 6.40 0.7 97.6 0.14
Age of head (years) Unmatched 51.52 50.65 6.1 0.95
Matched 50.91 51.62 -5 18.5 -0.76
Years of education of head Unmatched 4.95 4.76 4.5 0.69
Matched 4.98 4.62 8.6 -93.8 1.27
Mother tongue of head is spanish Unmatched 0.76 0.66 22 3.41 ***
Matched 0.75 0.75 1 95.2 0.16
Family size Unmatched 3.91 4.30 -17.9 -2.78
Matched 4.02 3.97 2.2 87.5 0.34
Time from plot to farmer house Unmatched 20.51 23.93 -11.4 -1.77
Matched 21.07 21.70 -2.1 81.6 -0.32
Plot has high slope Unmatched 0.12 0.13 -3.8 -0.59
Matched 0.12 0.13 -1.5 59.5 -0.23
Plot is in middle altitude area Unmatched 0.28 0.28 -0.4 -0.06
Matched 0.27 0.27 -0.2 43.1 -0.03
Plot is in high altitude area Unmatched 0.26 0.17 22 3.42 ***
Matched 0.24 0.25 -4 81.9 -0.56
Percentage of plot with irrigation Unmatched 49.37 43.80 11.5 1.79
Matched 49.09 49.03 0.1 98.8 0.02
Index of erosion in plot Unmatched 0.40 0.38 3.3 0.51
Matched 0.42 0.43 -1.7 49.1 -0.24
Index of quality of plot Unmatched 3.12 3.18 -10.3 -1.6
Matched 3.13 3.10 4.9 53 0.73
Index of livestock  Unmatched 2718.30 3490.00 -18 -2.78
Matched 2751.30 2610.50 3.3 81.8 0.56
Area of the plot Unmatched 1.30 2.20 -20.3 -3.13 ***
Matched 1.35 1.42 -1.7 91.9 -0.36
Head has ID Unmatched 0.88 0.85 10.9 1.7
Matched 0.88 0.88 0.3 97.2 0.05
Spose has ID Unmatched 0.85 0.85 0.5 0.07
Matched 0.86 0.84 6 -1170.8 0.88
Time from plot to province capital Unmatched 0.52 0.66 -23.5 -3.65 ***
Matched 0.54 0.53 1.4 94.1 0.23
Time from plot to district capital Unmatched 56.79 82.36 -30.9 -4.8 ***
Matched 59.05 62.77 -4.5 85.4 -0.72
Level of land concentration (district) Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -46.7 -7.25 ***
Matched 0.02 0.02 -3.6 92.3 -0.57
Value of production per hectare (district) Unmatched 2.74 2.78 -2.3 -0.35
Matched 2.73 2.73 -0.1 95.1 -0.02
Dummy for Sierra Unmatched 0.13 0.16 -7.5 -1.16
Matched 0.14 0.15 -3.2 57.4 -0.48
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Table A.2.2 
Balancing of samples by matching: credit unconstrained households 
Variable
Area owned (hectares) Unmatched 6.6703 14.288 -48.8 -4.62 ***
Matched 6.9918 6.6751 2 95.8 0.31
Age of head (years) Unmatched 51.027 52.582 -10.7 -0.98
Matched 51.702 48.016 25.4 -137.1 2.36
Years of education of head Unmatched 4.7011 4.0065 17.7 1.62
Matched 4.3684 4.8903 -13.3 24.9 -1.26
Mother tongue of head is spanish Unmatched 0.58696 0.46405 24.7 2.26 **
Matched 0.55556 0.52124 6.9 72.1 0.63
Family size Unmatched 3.5761 4.2222 -28.4 -2.61 ***
Matched 3.6082 4.2365 -27.6 2.8 -2.74
Time from plot to farmer house Unmatched 18.467 26.216 -26 -2.41 **
Matched 18.778 17.93 2.8 89.1 0.31
Plot has high slope Unmatched 0.13587 0.18301 -12.9 -1.18
Matched 0.1462 0.15746 -3.1 76.1 -0.29
Plot is in middle altitude area Unmatched 0.36413 0.33333 6.4 0.59
Matched 0.38596 0.4003 -3 53.4 -0.27
Plot is in high altitude area Unmatched 0.27717 0.31373 -8 -0.73
Matched 0.2924 0.26393 6.2 22.1 0.59
Percentage of plot with irrigation Unmatched 47.833 35.454 26.1 2.38 **
Matched 45.534 46.963 -3 88.5 -0.27
Index of erosion in plot Unmatched 0.47826 0.54248 -7.7 -0.7
Matched 0.50877 0.57079 -7.4 3.4 -0.67
Index of quality of plot Unmatched 3.163 3.1307 5.6 0.51
Matched 3.1696 3.1682 0.2 95.7 0.02
Index of livestock  Unmatched 3163.3 4931.3 -35.4 -3.27 ***
Matched 3365.2 3350.8 0.3 99.2 0.03
Area of the plot Unmatched 1.3682 2.5827 -20.2 -1.9 *
Matched 1.3829 1.4461 -1 94.8 -0.14
Head has ID Unmatched 0.86413 0.79739 17.8 1.64
Matched 0.8538 0.88385 -8 55 -0.82
Spose has ID Unmatched 0.86413 0.87582 -3.5 -0.32
Matched 0.8655 0.87151 -1.8 48.6 -0.16
Time from plot to province capital Unmatched 0.44897 0.55034 -27.8 -2.56 **
Matched 0.46272 0.42816 9.5 65.9 0.96
Time from plot to district capital Unmatched 64.299 81.144 -17.9 -1.63
Matched 67.246 65.833 1.5 91.6 0.14
Level of land concentration (district) Unmatched 0.02051 0.02711 -59.1 -5.5 ***
Matched 0.02059 0.02039 1.8 96.9 0.19
Value of production per hectare (distUnmatched 2.4457 2.1105 28.3 2.57 **
Matched 2.4305 2.3154 9.7 65.7 0.86
Dummy for Sierra Unmatched 0.1087 0.01961 36.9 3.27 **
Matched 0.07018 0.06423 2.5 93.3 0.22





Probit model for program participation: Plots in non-conditioned case 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z
Area owned (hectares) -0.015 0.005 -3.09 ***
Age of head (years) 0.005 0.004 1.33
Years of education of head 0.011 0.012 0.91
Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.359 0.109 3.29 ***
Family size -0.050 0.022 -2.22 **
Time from plot to farmer house 0.000 0.001 0.26
Plot has high slope -0.052 0.135 -0.38
Plot is in middle altitude area 0.065 0.112 0.58
Plot is in high altitude area 0.496 0.126 3.93 ***
Percentage of plot with irrigation 0.003 0.001 2.87 **
Index of erosion in plot -0.003 0.060 -0.04
Index of quality of plot -0.165 0.079 -2.09 **
Index of livestock  0.000 0.000 -0.31
Area of the plot -0.001 0.013 -0.08
Head has ID 0.289 0.141 2.04 **
Spose has ID 0.001 0.139 0.01
Time from plot to province capital -0.344 0.096 -3.58 ***
Time from plot to district capital -0.003 0.001 -5.15 ***
Level of land concentration (district) -21.729 3.705 -5.87 ***
Value of production per hectare (district) -0.010 0.031 -0.31
Dummy for Sierra -0.328 0.154 -2.13 ***
Constant 0.803 0.439 1.83 *
Number of observations 965
LR 168.11
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.1257  
 
   48
 
Table A.2.4 
Probit model for program participation: 
Plots in high density sectors (conditioned) 
Coef. Std. Err. z
Area owned (hectares) -0.018 0.009 -2.02 **
Age of head (years) 0.003 0.007 0.42
Years of education of head 0.046 0.026 1.8 *
Mother tongue of head is spanish 0.320 0.178 1.8 *
Family size -0.087 0.040 -2.18 **
Time from plot to farmer house 0.000 0.003 -0.13
Plot has high slope -0.135 0.220 -0.62
Plot is in middle altitude area -0.090 0.199 -0.45
Plot is in high altitude area 0.036 0.214 0.17
Percentage of plot with irrigation 0.002 0.002 1.16
Index of erosion in plot -0.005 0.095 -0.05
Index of quality of plot -0.200 0.154 -1.29
Index of livestock  0.000 0.000 -0.06
Area of the plot 0.013 0.017 0.76
Head has ID 0.664 0.262 2.54 **
Spose has ID -0.641 0.294 -2.18 **
Time from plot to province capital -0.551 0.253 -2.17 **
Time from plot to district capital -0.001 0.001 -1.54
Level of land concentration (district) -34.184 8.199 -4.17 ***
Value of production per hectare (district) -0.005 0.084 -0.06
Dummy for Sierra 0.747 0.419 1.78 *
Constant 1.816 0.891 2.04 **
Number of observations 337
LR 84.12
Prob > chi2 0
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Table A.2.5. Balancing of samples of plots, unconditioned case 
Sample Treated Control %bias bias t
Farm size Unmatched 7.55 9.98 -13.2 -2.09 **
Matched 7.74 7.21 2.9 78.2 0.46
Age of head (years) Unmatched 51.42 50.81 4.3 0.68
Matched 50.71 51.85 -8.1 -86.2 -1.23
Years of education of head Unmatched 4.87 4.71 3.7 0.58
Matched 4.92 4.65 6.6 -79.3 0.99
Mother tongue of head is spanish Unmatched 0.77 0.67 23 3.63 **
Matched 0.76 0.75 2 91.2 0.32
Family size Unmatched 4.00 4.29 -13.2 -2.09 **
Matched 4.07 3.97 4.7 64.5 0.72
Time from plot to province capital Unmatched 0.51 0.65 -24.5 -3.87 **
Matched 0.53 0.53 0.1 99.4 0.02
Time from plot to district capital Unmatched 56.68 80.84 -29.5 -4.65 **
Matched 58.72 61.75 -3.7 87.4 -0.6
Time from plot to farmer house Unmatched 20.44 24.28 -12.6 -1.99 **
Matched 20.85 22.40 -5.1 59.4 -0.78
Plot has high slope Unmatched 0.14 0.13 3.1 0.49
Matched 0.14 0.14 -1.3 59.1 -0.19
Plot is in medium altitude area Unmatched 0.27 0.27 -0.3 -0.05
Matched 0.26 0.26 -0.9 -189.8 -0.13
Plot is in high altitude area Unmatched 0.27 0.16 27.1 4.28 **
Matched 0.26 0.26 -0.3 98.9 -0.04
Percentage of plot with irrigation Unmatched 47.65 45.01 5.4 0.86
Matched 47.10 49.05 -4 26 -0.61
Index of erosion in plot Unmatched 0.43 0.36 11 1.75 *
Matched 0.44 0.45 -2.2 79.8 -0.32
Index of quality of plot Unmatched 3.25 3.19 4.4 0.69
Matched 3.25 3.17 5 -14.5 0.75
Value of cattle (1994) Unmatched 2811.9 3443.7 -14.8 -2.33 **
Matched 2845.1 2683.1 3.8 74.3 0.65
Size of of the plot Unmatched 2.19 2.26 -0.5 -0.07
Matched 2.27 2.04 1.6 -254.8 0.24
Head has ID (dni) Unmatched 0.89 0.85 11.5 1.81 *
Matched 0.88 0.88 0.8 92.8 0.13
Spouse has ID (dni) Unmatched 0.84 0.86 -3.9 -0.62
Matched 0.85 0.83 6 -52.1 0.89
Level of land concentration (district) Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -48.4 -7.63 **
Matched 0.02 0.02 -2.2 95.5 -0.36
Sierra dummy Unmatched 0.13 0.18 -14.5 -2.28 **
Matched 0.13 0.14 -3 79.3 -0.48  
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Table A.2.6. Balancing of samples of plots, conditioned case (high density) 
Sample Treated Control %bias bias t
Farm size Unmatched 8.1228 13.52 -38.2 -3.9 **
Matched 8.3093 7.012 9.2 76 1.4
Farm size (has) Unmatched 51.209 51.864 -5 -0.46
Matched 50.702 49.532 9 -78.7 0.92
Age of head (years) Unmatched 4.3543 4.1591 4.8 0.45
Matched 4.2851 4.5776 -7.1 -49.8 -0.81
Years of education of head Unmatched 0.70079 0.44697 52.9 5.0 **
Matched 0.68595 0.67818 1.6 96.9 0.18
Mother tongue of head is spanish Unmatched 3.752 3.9697 -9.8 -0.91
Matched 3.781 3.9073 -5.7 42 -0.66
Family size Unmatched 0.55843 0.60191 -12.4 -1.17
Matched 0.57626 0.5895 -3.8 69.6 -0.43
Time from plot to province capital Unmatched 65.717 71.674 -6.4 -0.6
Matched 67.665 72.798 -5.5 13.9 -0.59
Time from plot to district capital Unmatched 17.386 23.129 -20 -1.96 **
Matched 17.541 17.815 -1 95.2 -0.13
Time from plot to farmer house Unmatched 0.15508 0.12024 14.3 1.34
Matched 0.15761 0.19401 -15 -4.5 -1.42
Plot has high slope Unmatched 0.31496 0.38636 -15 -1.41
Matched 0.33058 0.34221 -2.4 83.7 -0.27
Plot is in medium altitude area Unmatched 0.29921 0.2803 4.2 0.39
Matched 0.28512 0.29908 -3.1 26.2 -0.34
Plot is in high altitude area Unmatched 37.131 32.761 9.5 0.88
Matched 36.348 35.094 2.7 71.3 0.3
Percentage of plot with irrigation Unmatched 0.53472 0.66212 -17.4 -1.58
Matched 0.54884 0.58776 -5.3 69.4 -0.57
Index of erosion in plot Unmatched 3.1044 3.1225 -3.8 -0.34
Matched 3.1165 3.1413 -5.2 -37.5 -0.59
Index of quality of plot Unmatched 2838.5 4761.6 -37.7 -3.76 **
Matched 2820 2738.4 1.6 95.8 0.21
Value of cattle (1994) Unmatched 1.4987 2.7984 -22.9 -2.4 **
Matched 1.548 1.3402 3.7 84 0.72
Size of of the plot Unmatched 0.90157 0.89394 2.5 0.24
Matched 0.90083 0.89702 1.3 50.1 0.14
Head has ID (dni) Unmatched 0.87008 0.89394 -7.4 -0.68
Matched 0.88017 0.86797 3.8 48.9 0.4
Spouse has ID (dni) Unmatched 0.02009 0.02435 -48.1 -4.62 **
Matched 0.02021 0.02066 -5 89.5 -0.57
Level of land concentration (district) Unmatched 0.07087 0.0303 18.5 1.63
Matched 0.07438 0.07377 0.3 98.5 0.03  